Geopolitical and Media Analysis of the Middle East

From a War of Attrition to “Negotiations Under Pressure”

The Middle East appears to have entered a decisive and highly fluid phase.

Several developments are unfolding simultaneously: Washington and Tehran, according to Pakistani officials, appear to be moving closer to some form of agreement; attacks on shipping are continuing; Israel has rejected the Trump administration’s proposed 15-point Gaza plan; and the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have entered a more dangerous phase.

This apparent contradiction is actually the key to understanding the current situation:

Diplomacy is advancing, but the war has not ended—because each side wants to enter negotiations with the strongest possible leverage.

1. The Strait of Hormuz Is No Longer Just a Waterway

The most important geopolitical development may be the transformation of the Strait of Hormuz from a maritime passage into a bargaining instrument.

Iran has indicated that Hormuz will not fully reopen unless the United States changes its behavior. Washington, meanwhile, has claimed control of the strait and continues to emphasize economic and military pressure.

From a geopolitical perspective:

Hormuz = oil + global shipping + Gulf security + U.S. military credibility + Iranian bargaining power

For this reason, Tehran is unlikely to surrender the Hormuz card early in negotiations.

A more likely model would be:

limited reopening in exchange for concrete concessions.

In other words:

“Step-by-step access in exchange for step-by-step concessions.”

2. Why Is Washington Talking About Both “Control of Hormuz” and Negotiations?

This is not necessarily a contradiction.

It can be understood as a negotiating strategy.

Washington wants to send the following message:

“We can maintain pressure, but there is a political exit if Tehran makes concessions.”

Pakistan’s recent statements that Iran and the United States may be approaching some form of agreement reinforce this interpretation.

The likely U.S. strategy is therefore:

Military pressure → economic pressure → mediation → limited agreement → gradual de-escalation

rather than an open-ended commitment to permanent war.

3. The Netanyahu Problem

One of the most important complications is emerging inside the U.S.-Israeli relationship.

Trump’s proposed 15-point Gaza plan has reportedly faced opposition from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who continues to emphasize Hamas’s complete disarmament and Israel’s security requirements.

This is strategically important.

If Washington moves toward a broader agreement with Tehran while Israel continues military operations in Gaza or Lebanon, the region could enter a new phase:

“Wars after the war.”

In other words, the major Iran-U.S. confrontation could decline while smaller regional conflicts continue.

4. Yemen Could Become the Most Dangerous Variable

The Yemen front deserves particular attention.

Houthi attacks against shipping in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb create a second major pressure point alongside Hormuz.

This produces a potentially dangerous geopolitical equation:

Strait of Hormuz → Iranian pressure

Bab el-Mandeb → Houthi pressure

And between them:

Global oil markets + international shipping

This is what could transform a regional crisis into a global economic crisis.

The danger is not necessarily that every attack will lead to a major war. The greater danger is accidental escalation.

A single maritime incident involving American personnel, a major tanker, or a vessel carrying nationals from a powerful country could trigger a chain reaction.

5. The Media War May Be Almost as Important as the Military War

One of the most important characteristics of the current crisis is that every major actor is presenting the situation through a different narrative.

Washington:

“We control the Strait of Hormuz.”

Tehran:

“Hormuz will not reopen until the United States changes its behavior.”

Pakistan:

“Both sides are moving closer to an agreement.”

Israel:

“The American Gaza proposal is insufficient.”

The Houthis:

“The pressure on Israel and its allies will continue.”

These are not simply different descriptions of the same events.

They are strategic narratives.

Modern conflicts are fought not only over territory and military capabilities, but also over the interpretation of reality.

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6. Why Does the Narrative Matter?

When Washington says:

“We control Hormuz,”

the statement is aimed at more than Iran.

It is also directed at:

• global energy markets
• shipping companies
• insurance markets
• Gulf Arab states
• international investors
• U.S. allies

Likewise, when Tehran says:

“The reopening of Hormuz is conditional,”

the message is not merely for domestic consumption.

It is also directed at Washington, the energy market and international negotiators.

Therefore, analysts must distinguish between:

reported fact → official claim → battlefield reality → strategic interpretation.

Confusing these four categories is one of the biggest weaknesses of contemporary war reporting.

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7. My Forecast for the Coming Weeks

I would currently place the main scenarios roughly as follows:

Scenario	Approximate probability
Temporary Iran-U.S. agreement and gradual de-escalation	45%
Prolonged conflict combined with behind-the-scenes negotiations	30%
Renewed major Iran-U.S. escalation	15%
Expansion into a broader regional war	10%

These percentages are analytical estimates, not official forecasts or statistical measurements.

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🟢 Scenario One: A Temporary Agreement

This is, in my assessment, the most likely outcome.

But I would not expect a comprehensive peace agreement immediately.

A more realistic possibility is a limited, phased agreement.

For example:

Iran: reduction or suspension of certain military activities

↓

United States: reduction in attacks and selected economic pressure

↓

Hormuz: controlled or partial reopening

↓

Further negotiations: nuclear issues, sanctions, missiles and regional affairs

This type of arrangement would allow both sides to claim that they achieved something without appearing to surrender.

🟡 Scenario Two: Neither War nor Peace

This may actually become the defining condition of the region.

The direct Iran-U.S. confrontation could decline while:

• Hormuz remains only partially open
• Yemen remains active
• Gaza remains unstable
• Lebanon remains vulnerable
• Iraq remains under pressure
• sporadic attacks continue

The Middle East could therefore enter a prolonged state of:

“No war, no peace.”

This scenario could last for months.

🔴 Scenario Three: The War Explodes Again

The greatest danger is a failed negotiation combined with a single major incident.

For example:

Attack on a ship

↓

American casualties

↓

U.S. retaliation

↓

Iranian or allied response

↓

Further restrictions on Hormuz

↓

Israeli or regional intervention

↓

New escalation

This is the classic escalation spiral.

The parties may not initially want a larger war, but events can create a dynamic that becomes increasingly difficult to control.

🔵 What Could Happen Over the Coming Months?

If negotiations succeed, I would expect something resembling the following sequence:

Phase One

Reduction in military operations

Phase Two

Partial reopening of maritime routes

Phase Three

Temporary nuclear/economic agreement

Phase Four

Negotiations over sanctions and Iranian assets

Phase Five

Negotiations over Iran’s regional influence

The fifth stage could be the most difficult.

Washington is unlikely to limit the future regional settlement entirely to the nuclear issue.

The broader question is likely to become:

What role will Iran play in the future security architecture of the Middle East?

🇮🇷 What Is the Strategic Choice Facing Iran?

Tehran appears to have two broad options.

Option One: Maximize Hormuz as Leverage

Advantage:
Greater bargaining power.

Risk:
Potentially creating a broader international coalition against Iran.

Option Two: Gradually Reopen Hormuz in Exchange for Concessions

Advantage:
Converting military leverage into economic and diplomatic gains.

Risk:
Giving up leverage before receiving sufficient guarantees.

For that reason, I would expect Iran to avoid reopening Hormuz completely and unconditionally.

A more likely strategy is:

“Controlled reopening in exchange for reciprocal concessions.”

🇺🇸 What Does Washington Ultimately Want?

The United States is probably seeking more than simply reopening Hormuz.

Washington may attempt to use the current crisis to establish a new security framework for the Persian Gulf.

Such a framework could involve:

A weaker Iran

greater confidence among Arab allies

a stronger U.S. security role

greater protection for energy routes

But there is a serious danger.

If Washington pushes too hard, the result could be the opposite:

Iran + Russia + China + regional actors

coordinating more closely against U.S. influence.

That would make the strategic cost for Washington significantly higher.

🇮🇱 Israel: The Unpredictable Variable

Israel could become the most important variable outside Washington’s direct control.

The disagreement over Gaza demonstrates that Israeli strategic priorities do not necessarily coincide completely with American priorities.

This creates a potentially important contradiction:

Washington may want a broader agreement with Iran

while

Israel may want to preserve and expand its military gains in Gaza and potentially Lebanon.

This gap deserves close monitoring in the coming weeks.

🎯 The Broader Geopolitical Picture

The central development is not simply the question of whether the current war ends.

The deeper issue is:

Who will define the next security order in the Middle East?

Three major actors are testing each other.

United States

Wants to preserve deterrence, protect energy routes and maintain its strategic position.

Iran

Wants to demonstrate that Gulf security cannot be managed without Tehran.

Israel

Wants the military outcome of the conflict to translate into long-term political and strategic gains.

Around them are other increasingly important players:

Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Pakistan, Turkey, Iraq and Yemen.

These states could become critical in shaping the next phase.

🔥 My Bottom-Line Forecast

If I had to make a clear prediction:

Over the next 2–4 weeks, a limited agreement is more likely than the outbreak of a completely new full-scale war.

But such an agreement would probably not represent the end of the crisis.

Instead, it could mark the beginning of a second phase:

“The war stops—but the negotiation over the new Middle Eastern order begins.”

And in that negotiation, four cards will probably carry enormous strategic value:

Hormuz

Oil

Sanctions

Iran’s regional network

But there is a fifth card capable of disrupting the entire equation:

Gaza — and Netanyahu’s decisions.

 

نویسنده:amin kaidi shadgan

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